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1 Abstract
This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered
a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the
ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor
an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by
asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and
non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or
even absence of sufficient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we
characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that
distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.
2 Introduction
In polls many citizens express some dissatisfaction with politicians. Usual ways to
voice this disaffection in elections are absenteeism, spoiled or blank vote, or voting for
an unviable candidate. No legitimate and explicit negative option is generally provided
to electors. There are some exceptions. In the State of Nevada voters can express their
disapproval of all official candidates with the “none of the above candidate” option
(Arcelus, Mauser and Spindler, 1978). In 1987 the deputies elections were reorganized
in the former Soviet Union. Under the new rule, voters crossed off the names of those
against whom they wished to vote (Hahn, 1988). The same rule is used in some Chinese
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village elections (Zhong and Chen, 2002). For some other historical examples of rules
that include negative options, see Kang (2010).
If all voters have a clear-cut (i.e., positive or negative) opinion on each candidate,
the previous rule is equivalent to approval voting: candidates who are not crossed off
the list are the approved candidates.
However it is not rare that voters are indifferent or even lack the sufficient knowl-
edge to express a positive or a negative opinion on some candidates. When indifference
exists, the two rules differ because the non disapproved candidates consist of the ap-
proved candidates and those who leave the voter indifferent.
Both rules can be extended to include indifference as a third explicit option. The
new rule, that we refer to as dis&approval voting, requires voters to cast a positive,
negative or null vote on each candidate. In case of a blank or spoiled vote the vote is
considered as null. The dis&approval rule selects the candidates who obtain the largest
difference between the number of positive votes and the number of negative votes.
Earlier references have studied this rule. Felsenthal (1989) compares it with ap-
proval voting from a voter’s point of view. Hillinger (2004, 2005) advocates for its use
for general elections. Lepelley and Smaoui (2012) study some of its properties, while
Baujard and Igersheim (2011) test it in a frame-field experiment during the French
presidential elections. However the literature has not provided a characterization of
the rule. We focus on providing one such characterization.
Fishburn (1978a, 1978b) characterizes approval voting with the help of four axioms.
Alo´s-Ferrer (2006) shows that one axiom (neutrality) is unnecessary and provides a
characterization based on faithfulness, cancellation and consistency. Faithfulness re-
quires that if the society consists of one individual, his or her approved candidate(s)
is (are) selected. Cancellation requires that whenever all candidates receive the same
number of approvals, the full set of candidates is selected. Consistency requires that
whenever there are common selected candidates for two disjoint societies, those can-
didates that were selected for both of the original societies are exactly the candidates
that are selected for the joint society. In this paper we provide a characterization of the
dis&approval rule in similar terms. However we make note that the adapted version of
cancellation to our context with three-option ballots is not sufficient for our purpose,
and a stronger (under consistency) requirement is introduced in its place, namely a
‘compensation’ property. This requires that if all candidates receive as many approvals
as disapprovals, then the full set of candidates is selected.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces our model. Section 4 pro-
vides a characterization of the dis&approval rule and the discussion about the necessity
of replacing ‘cancellation’ by ‘compensation’. Then Section 5 gives some concluding
remarks.
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3 Ternary ballots electing rules
Henceforth we refer to the following setting. There is a set C composed of c candidates
and there is an electorate N of n voters. Generic candidates are denoted by x, y, z,
and generic voters by i, j, k. Voters are asked to cast a (ternary) ballot where, for
each candidate, they answer the question: Would each of the following candidates be
a good president/head of .../ etc.? 1 Each voter can either answer “yes”, or “no”,
or “indifferent, abstain or do not know”. Voters are warned that when a candidate
receives a blank vote, the latter option is marked by default.
We proceed to describe two different ways to model the relevant information from
the recount of these ballots. The first one, namely vote profiles, captures the gross
collection of the possible outcomes of the voting. The second one, namely vote response
profiles, is more efficient (but possibly, less natural at first glance) because it aggregates
equal ballots so that the identities of the voters are lost. Ballot aggregation functions
are the formal expression of voting rules. Consequently we express our characterization
of the dis&approval rule/ballot aggregation function in terms of vote response profiles.
We stress that for the case of anonymous electing rules where the identities of the
voters do not matter, both approaches are equivalent.
3.1 Vote profiles of ternary ballots
Voter i’s ternary ballot can be represented by a 3-partition of the set of candidates
Ci(C) = (C+i (C), C0i (C), C−i (C)), where C+i (C) are the candidates whom i approves,
C−i (C) are the candidates whom voter i disapproves, and C
0
i (C) are the remaining
candidates (i.e., those who either leave voter i indifferent, or on whom voter i does not
emit an opinion, or on whom voter i admits ignorance). If voter i does not show up




i (C), and C
−
i (C) are
denoted by c+i (C), c
0
i (C), and c
−
i (C). When the set of candidates is clear from the
context we just write Ci = (C+i , C0i , C−i ) and c+i , c0i , c−i . Most rules (as the classical
plurality rule) impose c+i 6 1 for all voters, but we are not bound by such restriction.
A vote profile of ternary ballots gives the summary of all ternary ballots cast by
all voters. Henceforth we omit the reference to ternary ballots for simplicity. A vote
profile is denoted by C(N,C), with C(N,C) = (C1(C), ..., Cn(C)) if N = {1, 2, ..., n}.
When N = {i} then C({i}, C) = Ci(C) abusing notation. We assume that at least a
1Therefore, the question to be confronted by a voter must not suggest “how do you compare the
candidates,” but instead it must mean “how do you evaluate each candidate.” Balinski and Laraki
(2011, p. 30). The very different questions posed in two 2007 polls (see above, Table 2.20): “Would
each of the following candidates be a good President of France?” and “Do you personally wish each
of the following candidates to win the presidential election?” The first poses an absolute question, the
second a relative one. The first invites an evaluation, the second suggests a contrast. The answers
are, in consequence, completely different. Significantly, the first question elicited a “yes” for the four
major candidates considerably more in keeping with their Good or better grades in the 2007 majority
judgment experience than did the second question. Balinski and Laraki (2011, p. 42)
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candidate receives a positive vote: 2 there always exists at least a pair formed by a
candidate x and a voter i such that x ∈ C+i (C). Fishburn and Brams (1978, p. 833)
define unconcerned voters as voters who are indifferent among all candidates. In this
vein we say that voter i is unconcerned if C0i (C) = C.
We use the following operations: merging two disjoint electorates and suppress-
ing a candidate from the list of candidates. Consider two disjoint electorates N1 =
{1, 2, ..., N1} and N2 = {N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N1 + N2} with vote profiles C(N1, C) and
C(N2, C). We define the vote profile on the merged electorate N1∪N2 = {1, ..., N1+N2}
as C(N1 ∪ N2, C) = (C(N1, C), C(N2, C)), which presumes that the evaluation of one
electorate is not affected by the other electorate. Suppose now that a vote profile
C(N,C) is given and we drop a candidate x from C. When voters do not modify their
opinion with respect to the other candidates under this circumstance, it turns out that
Ci(C \{x}) = (C+i (C)\{x}, C0i (C)\{x}, C−i (C)\{x}) for each i. Thus the vote profile
that results from dropping candidate x is C(N,C\{x}) = (C1(C\{x}), ..., Cn(C\{x})).
Definition 1 A ballot aggregation function on vote profiles is a correspondence W that
assigns a non-empty set of candidates to every vote profile.
Unless otherwise stated, we refer to anonymous ballot aggregation functions on
vote profiles. These are ballot aggregation functions on vote profiles that are invariant
under any permutation of the voters. Formally speaking:
Definition 2 A ballot aggregation function on vote profiles W is anonymous when for
each bijective map σ : N → N , if C(N,C) = (C1(N,C), ..., CN(N,C)) and C ′(N,C) =
(Cσ(1)(N,C), ..., Cσ(N)(N,C)) then W (C(N,C)) = W (C ′(N,C)).
3.2 Vote response profiles of ternary ballots
We now reinterpret the specification of our model in line with the inspiring Alo´s-Ferrer
(2006).
Let T denote the set of all ternary ballots T = (C+, C0, C−) on the set C of
candidates. A vote profile naturally induces a vote response profile of ternary ballots
pi : T −→ N. Henceforth we omit the reference to ternary ballots for simplicity. We
interpret pi(T ) as the number of voters that cast ballot T . Therefore one cannot recover
the original vote profile (of ternary ballots) from its induced vote response profile (of
ternary ballots). Because we are going to maintain anonymity throughout, that fact
does not handicap our alternative, more concise notation. The class of all vote response
profiles is denoted by Π, thus we are allowing for variable electorate size. Obviously
the number of voters in the electorate is
∑{pi(T ) : T ∈ T }. Every T ∈ T can be
identified with piT such that piT (T ) = 1, piT (T ′) = 0 otherwise. Summing up two vote
response profiles corresponds to merging the vote profiles of two disjoint societies.
2In particular we do not allow that all voters cast abstain/negative votes for all candidates. With
this requirement we avoid stating that all candidates must be elected in case that everyone votes
against all candidates.
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Definition 3 A ballot aggregation function on vote response profiles is a correspon-
dence W that assigns a non-empty set of candidates to every pi ∈ Π.
Each W given by Definition 3 is anonymous in a sense alike to Definition 2, since
vote response profiles capture the number of ballots of each type without any reference
to specific voters. Furthermore, (anonymous) ballot aggregation functions on vote pro-
files are redefined from Definition 3 because vote profiles induce vote response profiles,
thus we simply refer to ballot aggregation functions in the following.
The following tallies are defined for each vote response profile pi ∈ Π and x ∈ C:
n+(x, pi) =
∑{pi(T ) : T = (C+, C0, C−) ∈ T , x ∈ C+}, n−(x, pi) = ∑{pi(T ) : T =
(C+, C0, C−) ∈ T , x ∈ C−}, and n0(x, pi) = ∑{pi(T ) : T = (C+, C0, C−) ∈ T , x ∈
C0}. We gather n(x, pi) = (n+(x, pi), n0(x, pi), n−(x, pi)). When pi is induced by a
vote profile C(N,C) then we also write n+(x, C(N,C)) = n+(x, pi), n0(x, C(N,C)) =
n0(x, pi), n−(x, C(N,C)) = n−(x, pi), and n(x, C(N,C)) = n(x, pi).
4 A characterization of the dis&approval voting rule
The dis&approval rule is the ballot aggregation function where W (pi) is the subset of
C formed by the candidates that maximize vH(x, pi) = n
+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi).
It is easy to check that the dis&approval rule satisfies the three axioms that charac-
terize the approval rule (v. Alo´s-Ferrer, 2006) when they are extended to the ternary
ballots framework in the following way. Consistency can be adapted without changes.
It requires that whenever there are common selected candidates for two disjoint soci-
eties, those candidates that were selected for both of the original societies are exactly
those who are selected for the joint society. Formally:
Consistency: for each pi, pi′ ∈ Π, if W (pi) ∩W (pi′) 6= ∅ then W (pi + pi′) = W (pi) ∩
W (pi′).
In the binary ballots framework cancellation requires that whenever all candidates
receive the same number of approvals, the full set of candidates is selected. In order
to adapt it to the ternary ballots framework, we require that whenever all candidates
receive the same number of approvals and the same number of disapprovals, then the
full set of candidate is selected. Formally:
AD-cancellation: for each pi, pi′ ∈ Π, if for all x ∈ C it is true that n+(x, pi) =
n+(x, pi′) and n−(x, pi) = n−(x, pi′) then W (pi) = W (pi′).
In the binary ballots framework faithfulness requires that if the society consists of
one individual then his or her approved candidate(s) is (are) selected. In the ternary
ballots framework we have to state what happens in case the individual approves
no candidate. Under such circumstance, in our version all candidates are selected if
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all candidates are disapproved, otherwise the candidates for whom the individual is
indifferent are selected. 3 Formally:
(0, -1)-faithfulness: for all T = (C+, C0, C−) ∈ T ,
W (piT ) = W (T ) =

C+ if C+ 6= ∅,
C if C− = C,
C0 otherwise.
Nonetheless these three properties, namely, consistency, AD-cancellation and (0,−1)-
faithfulness, do not characterize the dis&approval voting. Although they are implied
by this rule, they do not uniquely determine it. We demonstrate this in Example 1
below:
Example 1 Define W ∗(pi) as the subset of C formed by the candidates that sequen-
tially maximize u(x, pi) = (n+(x, pi) − n−(x, pi), n+(x, pi)) in the following sense: In
order for x to be elected not only it must maximize n+(x, pi) − n−(x, pi) over C, but
also it must maximize n+(x, pi) over the set of maximizers of n+(x, pi) − n−(x, pi).
In words: among the candidates that have the highest difference approvals vs. disap-
provals, only the candidates that have the highest number of approvals are selected.
Clearly this is not the dis&approval rule.
However this expression defines a ballot aggregation function that satisfies consis-
tency, AD-cancellation and (0,−1)-faithfulness. AD-cancellation and (0,−1)-faith-
fulness are trivial. To check for consistency, suppose pi, pi′ ∈ Π and W ∗(pi)∩W ∗(pi′) 6=
∅. Let us denote A1(x) = n+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi) and B1(x) = n+(x, pi′)− n−(x, pi′). Ob-
serve that n+(x, pi+pi′) = n+(x, pi)+n+(x, pi′) and n−(x, pi+pi′) = n−(x, pi)+n−(x, pi′).
Therefore if we let C1(x) = n
+(x, pi+pi′)− n−(x, pi+pi′), then C1(x) = A1(x)+B1(x).
W ∗(pi), respectively W ∗(pi′), denote the non-empty set of candidates that maximize
A1(x), respectively B1(x), and whose evaluations by n
+(x, pi), respectively n+(x, pi′),
are highest among the maximizers of A1(x), respectively B1(x). By assumption
W ∗(pi) ∩W ∗(pi′) 6= ∅. Now some tedious but straightforward computations show that
the maximizers of C1(x) whose evaluation by n
+(x, pi + pi′) is highest coincides with
W ∗(pi) ∩W ∗(pi′). This boils down to W ∗(pi + pi′) = W ∗(pi) ∩W ∗(pi′).
In order to characterize the dis&approval rule we replace cancellation with an alter-
native property, that we refer to as AD-compensation. It states that if all candidates
receive the same number of approvals than of disapprovals then the set of selected
candidates is the whole set of candidates. Formally:
AD-compensation: for each pi ∈ Π, n+(x, pi) = n−(x, pi) for all x ∈ C implies
W (pi) = C.
3This is in line with the role of this property in the characterization by Alo´s-Ferrer (2006), as
explained in his Footnote 3.
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Lemma 1 below demonstrates that AD-compensation is stronger that cancellation
in the presence of consistency. To prove it we introduce some additional notation that
we also use along the remaining of this section. We let TI = (∅, C,∅) and with each
T = (C+, C0, C−) ∈ T we associate T± = (C−, C0, C+). Observe that if W is a ballot
aggregation function that satisfies AD-compensation then W (T + T±) = C for all
T ∈ T .
Lemma 1 If a ballot aggregation function W satisfies AD-compensation and consis-
tency then it satisfies AD-cancellation.
Proof. Suppose pi, pi′ ∈ Π are such that for all x ∈ C it is true that n+(x, pi) =
n+(x, pi′) and n−(x, pi) = n−(x, pi′). With each pi ∈ Π we associate pi± ∈ Π by the
expression pi±(T ) = pi(T±) for all T ∈ T . AD-compensation yields W (pi + pi±) = C =
W (pi′ + pi±). Consistency yields W (pi) = W (pi + pi′ + pi±) = W (pi′). 
We are in a position to prove our main result:
Theorem 1 The dis&approval rule is the only ballot aggregation function satisfying
AD-compensation, (0,−1)-faithfulness, and consistency.
Proof. We need to prove that if W is a ballot aggregation function that satisfies
AD-compensation, (0,−1)-faithfulness, and consistency then it coincides with the
dis&approval rule. Lemma 1 assures that AD-cancellation holds true, hence the distri-
bution of votes other than approved/disapproved does not affect the outcomes of W .
In particular, for each pi ∈ Π and T ∈ T
if T = (∅, C,∅) then W (pi) = W (pi + T ) (1)
which just means that voters that neither approve of nor disapprove of any candidate
do not affect the outcomes of W .
Step 1. For any pi ∈ Π and Ti = (C+i , C0i , C−i ) ∈ T , i = 1, 2, such that C+1 ∩ C+2 =
∅ = C−1 ∩ C−2 ,
W (pi + T1 + T2) = W (pi + T )
where T = (C+1 ∪ C+2 − (C−1 ∪ C−2 ), C0, C−1 ∪ C−2 − (C+1 ∪ C+2 )) = (C+, C0, C−) with
C0 = C − (C+ ∪ C−). Observe that W (T + T±) = C, and also W (T1 + T2 + T±) = C
by virtue of AD-compensation. Now consistency implies
W (pi + T1 + T2) = W (pi + T1 + T2 + T + T
±)
W (pi + T ) = W (pi + T + T1 + T2 + T
±)
Combining both results we get the desired equality.
We now fix an arbitrary pi ∈ Π.
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Step 2. Let pi′ ∈ Π be such that
(a) for all x ∈ C, n+(x, pi) = n+(x, pi′) and n−(x, pi) = n−(x, pi′), and
(b) if pi′(T = (C+, C0, C−)) > 0 then |C+ ∪ C−| = 1.
To construct pi′ ∈ Π we take apart every ternary ballot cast under pi into bal-
lots where exactly one candidate is either approved of or disapproved of, the other
candidates going into the other category.
Then AD-cancellation ensures W (pi) = W (pi′).
Step 3. There is p¯i ∈ Π such that
(a) for all x ∈ C, either n+(x, p¯i) = 0 or n−(x, p¯i) = 0
(b) for all x ∈ C, n+(x, p¯i) = n+(x, pi)−n−(x, pi) when n+(x, p¯i) > 0, and n−(x, p¯i) =
n−(x, pi)− n+(x, pi) when n−(x, p¯i) > 0
(c) if p¯i(T = (C+, C0, C−)) > 0 then |C+ ∪ C−| = 1
(d) W (pi) = W (pi′) = W (p¯i).
To prove this we proceed iteratively for the candidates in C.
For a fixed candidate x, suppose firstly K = n+(x, pi′) > n−(x, pi′) = k. If k = 0
then we are done with this candidate. Otherwise pi′ = pi+T1+...+TK+TK+1+...+TK+k
with the following structure: the ternary ballots T = (C+, C0, C−) for which pi(T ) > 0
verify both x /∈ C+∪C− and |C+∪C−| = 1; and the ternary ballots Ti = (C+i , C0i , C−i )
verify C+i = {x} and C−i = ∅ when i = 1, ..., K, C−i = {x} and C+i = ∅ when
i = K + 1, ..., K + k. Using Step 1
W (pi′) = W (pi + T2 + ...+ TK + TK+2 + ...+ TK+k + TI)
and now Eq. (1) yields W (pi′) = W (pi + T2 + ... + TK + TK+2 + ... + TK+k). After k
steps we reach W (pi′) = W (pi + Tk+1 + ... + TK) and we carry forward the profile in
the right-hand-side (which is simply pi when K = k) in order to continue our iteration
with the next candidate. To that purpose we observe that n+(y, pi′) = n+(y, pi) and
n−(y, pi′) = n−(y, pi) if candidate y has not been considered yet, and also that the
profile that we carry forward consists of ternary ballots T = (C+, C0, C−) with the
property that |C+ ∪ C−| = 1, and satisfies requirement (b) for x. Secondly, if K < k
then the argument is alike the case that we have considered.
Proceeding with all candidates in succesion we prove the claim.
Step 4. In order to conclude that W coincides with the dis&approval rule we proceed
to prove that W (p¯i) is the set of maximizers of n+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi).
In case that there is x with n+(x, p¯i) > 0, then for i = 1, ...,max{n+(x, p¯i) : x ∈ C}
we let C+i = {x ∈ C : n+(x, p¯i) > i} thus C+1 ⊇ C+2 ⊇ ..., and we select T+i =
(C+i , C − C+i ,∅).
In case that there is x with n−(x, p¯i) > 0, for i = 1, ...,max{n−(x, p¯i) : x ∈ C}
we let C−i = {x ∈ C : n−(x, p¯i) > i} thus C−1 ⊇ C−2 ⊇ ...., and we select T−i =
(∅, C − C−i , C−i ). Observe that when n−(x, p¯i) > t > 0 for each candidate x, one has
W (T−1 ) = ... = W (T
−
t ) = C.
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In case that there is x with n+(x, p¯i) = n−(x, p¯i), we select T−0 = (∅, C,∅) thus
W (T−0 ) = C.
The profile pi where each of these possible ballots is selected by exactly one voter
verifies W (p¯i) = W (pi) since n+(x, p¯i) = n+(x, pi) and n−(x, p¯i) = n−(x, pi) through-
out thus AD-cancellation applies. We conclude by showing that W (pi) is the set of
maximizers of n+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi):
Case 4.1: if there is x with n+(x, p¯i) > 0 then for α = max{n+(x, p¯i) : x ∈ C} one
has C+α ⊆ C+i = W (T+i ) for each possible i, and also C+α ⊆ W (T−i ) for each possible i
by using requirement (a) on pi where necessary. Consistency assures that W (pi) = C+α ,
which is the set of maximizers of n+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi) using requirement (b) on pi.
Case 4.2: if n+(x, p¯i) = n+(x, pi) = 0 and n−(x, p¯i) = n−(x, pi) = 0 for all x ∈ C
then n+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi) is constantly 0. AD-compensation assures W (pi) = C as the
dis&approval rule claims.
Case 4.3: if Cases 4.1 and 4.2 do not hold then for β = min{n−(x, p¯i) = n−(x, p¯i) −
n+(x, p¯i) : x ∈ C} > 0 one has W (T−β ) = C (both when β = 0 and when β >
0), and W (T−β+1) ⊆ W (T−β+2) ⊆ .... for each possible ternary ballot whenever β <
max{n−(x, p¯i) : x ∈ C}. When β = max{n−(x, p¯i) : x ∈ C} we have W (pi) = C,
otherwise consistency assures W (pi) = W (T−β+1), which is the set of maximizers of
n+(x, pi)− n−(x, pi) by requirement (b) on pi. 
5 Conclusion
The properties in our characterization of the dis&approval rule suffice to discuss on its
virtues and faults, but of course they do not exhaust the list of its relevant attributes.
They have further implications like AD-cancellation and others, and knowing them
helps to understand the normative behavior of the rule. It satisfies neutrality: the
names of the candidates do not matter. It also satisfies positive and negative unanimity:
if all voters vote in favor (resp., against) of some candidate(s), the candidate(s) should
(resp., should not) be selected. Independence of irrelevant alternative holds true too: if
a non selected candidate is removed from the list of candidate and this does not affect
the voters’ ballots for the remaining candidates, then the selected candidates do not
change. We can name other more technical properties, like tally-simplicity: when all
tallies coincide for each pair of candidates then all candidates are elected.
Furthermore, dis&approval voting satisfies some practical properties advanced by
Brams and Fishburn (2005, p. 461) as arguments in favor of approval voting. Approval
voting gives more flexible options than plurality voting, increases voter turnout, gives
minority candidates their proper due, and is as eminently practicable. Dis&approval
voting still enriches the options offered by approval voting by allowing voters to ex-
plicitly express disagreement with some (or all) candidates. If voters are better able
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to express their preferences they are more likely to vote. Moreover the electoral absen-
teeism due to the dissatisfaction with politicians would be reduced under dis&approval
voting. As under approval voting, minority candidates will not suffer. If supporters
are allowed to vote for several candidates, they will not be tempted to desert a candi-
date who is weak in the polls. Finally, dis&approval voting is also simple for voters to
understand and use. In fact, online practices show that a negative vote is as natural
as a positive vote (see for instance the thumb up or thumb down vote in Community
Question Answering sites such as Yahoo! Answers).
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